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This study argues against the expansive approach to the WHO reform, according to which to be a better global
health leader, WHO should do more, be given more power and financial resources, have more operational
capacities, and have more teeth by introducing more coercive monitoring and compliance mechanisms to its
IHR. The expansive approach is a political problem, whose root cause lies in ethics: WHO’s political overambition is
grounded on WHO’s lack of conceptual clarity on what good leadership means and what health (as a human right)
means. This study presents this ethical analysis by putting forth an alternative: the humble approach to the WHO
reform. It argues that to be a better leader, WHO should do much less and have a much narrower mandate. More
specifically, WHO should focus exclusively on coordination efforts, by ensuring truthful, evidence-based,
consistent, and timely shared communications regarding PHEIC among WHO member-states and other global
health stakeholders, if the organization desires to be a real global health leader whose authority the international
community respects and whose guidance people trust.
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has revived the protracted
political debates on the need to reform the World
Health Organization (WHO).1 These debates tend to
focus on the political implications of said reform, argu-
ably because of their more assessable impacts. The eth-
ical considerations of how the WHO should be reformed
to fulfill its purpose well are often left aside, as global
health experts tend to perceive theoretical clarifications
as less immediately relevant. This study provides a moral
critique of the main proposals for WHO reform, cur-
rently under debate in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In this way, this study fills a knowledge gap in the WHO
reform literature, by introducing the perspective of eth-
ics to critically examine the WHO mandate. Global
health scholars conventionally claim that the WHO’s
mandate should be reformed by way of expansion. In
other words, they argue that, in order to be a better global
health leader, WHO should do more, be given more
power and financial resources, have more presence on
the ground (where outbreaks actually happen), and have
more teeth by introducing more coercive monitoring
and compliance mechanisms to its International
Health Regulations (IHR)2—the binding legal
instrument that regulates and coordinates the actions
of WHO member-states in the event of public health
emergencies of international concern (PHEIC)
(Gostin, 2014, 2020; Gostin and Friedman, 2014;
Gostin et al., 2015; Kickbusch and Reddy, 2015;
Mackey, 2016; Negri, 2018; Burci, 2020; Gostin and
Wetter, 2020). I call this the expansive approach to
WHO reform. This study evaluates this conventional
approach in order to reveal the misunderstood correl-
ation between being a good leader and having an ambi-
tious mandate.
I argue that to be a better leader, WHO should do
much less and have a much narrower mandate. More
specifically, WHO should delegate more functions and
tasks to other global health stakeholders (especially local
actors), which are better situated to perform these func-
tions and tasks in more effective and efficient ways. In
delegating more functions and tasks to other global
health stakeholders, WHO could free itself to focus the
use of its scarce resources on coordination efforts, by
ensuring, more specifically, that communications
regarding PHEIC among all of these stakeholders are
truthful, evidence-based, consistent, and timely shared.
Gathering scientific evidence on how to control PHEIC
and communicating it in a truthful and timely manner
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should be, I contend, WHO’s sole priority mission result-
ing from the reform process to follow COVID-19. There
are two main reasons for this narrow mandate. First, by
focusing exclusively on ensuring truthful and timely com-
munications among stakeholders, WHO could be able to
concentrate its finite capacities in performing well its key
function as a coordinating body for global health threats
like pandemics. Second, in performing this core purpose
well, WHO could potentially regain public trust as a le-
gitimate coordinating authority for global health security
matters. Perhaps once trustworthiness is recovered,
WHO could then try to perform additional tasks and
functions—if the international community judges this
expansion suitable. However, the priority for the moment
is, I suggest in this study, to tame WHO’s ambitious man-
date with prudence and hindsight.
Although WHO’s overambition is a political problem,
its root cause lies in ethics: WHO’s political overambi-
tion is grounded on WHO’s lack of conceptual clarity on
what good leadership means and what health (as a
human right) means. This study presents this ethical
analysis in the following way: first it will discuss the ex-
pansive approach to the WHO reform and how it con-
flates good leadership in global health governance with
the ambition (perhaps desirable yet not politically feas-
ible or morally justifiable) to attain for all peoples the
(impossible) standard of complete health, as defined in
the WHO constitution and United Nations documents
establishing the human right to health. Then, the study
goes on to justify why WHO should be less ambitious, do
less, and have a much narrower mandate (i.e., focused on
good coordination by ensuring truthful, evidence-based,
consistent, and timely shared communications regard-
ing PHEIC among WHO member-states and other glo-
bal health stakeholders) if the organization desires to be a
real global health leader whose authority the inter-
national community respects and whose guidance peo-
ple trust.
The Expansive Approach to WHO
Reform
The WHO was founded in the aftermath of the Second
World War, in 1948, as an international organizational
and specialized agency of the United Nations, for the
“the purpose of co-operation to promote and protect
the health of all peoples”.3 Article 1 of the WHO consti-
tution specifies the objective of the WHO as the coordi-
nating authority for global health in this way: “the
objective of the WHO shall be the attainment by all
peoples of the highest possible levels of health,” where
health is, “a state of complete physical, mental and social
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity”.4 In order to attain this ambitious objective,
the WHO constitution then lists, in its article 2, a lengthy
list of 22 functions that the WHO ought to perform as
the coordinating authority for global health. These in-
clude, for example, certain functions that are more dir-
ectly relevant in the context of pandemics, such as the
function (g) to stimulate and advance work to eradicate
epidemic, endemic, and other diseases; (k) to propose
conventions, agreements and regulations, and make rec-
ommendations with respect to international health mat-
ters; and (s) to establish and revise as necessary
international nomenclatures of diseases, of causes of
death and public health practices. However, article 2 of
the WHO constitution also includes a number of more
general functions that the organization is equally
expected to perform to contribute to well-being broadly
defined. For example, WHO has also (i) to promote, in
cooperation with other specialized agencies where neces-
sary, the improvement of nutrition, housing, sanitation,
recreation, economic or working conditions and other
aspects of environmental hygiene. The WHO today call
these the “Social Determinants of Health”—SDH:
the conditions in which people are born, grow,
work, live, and age, and the wider set of forces and
systems shaping the conditions of daily life. These
forces and systems include economic policies and
systems, development agendas, social norms, so-
cial policies and political systems.5
In providing “a comprehensive blueprint for human
development,” SDH includes both conditions that are
directly connected to health and conditions that are
more tangentially connected to health. Either direct or
tangential, these are all surely important.6 Some of them
are considered so important that they ground separate
rights (e.g., right to housing, right to work, and envir-
onmental rights), which presumably would equally be
part of WHO’s mandate by way of conceptually falling
under the SDH’s comprehensive category. What these
general functions of the WHO and the SDH evince is the
all-inclusiveness of WHO’s functions. To be clear,
WHO’s functions are not restricted to controlling com-
municable disease outbreaks but go well beyond it in
order to respond to WHO’s ambitious mandate of
attaining the highest levels of complete physical, mental
and social well-being for all people.
The Politics Behind WHO’s Ambition
One reason for WHO’s ambition is political. WHO’s
mandate and functions, as defined in WHO’s
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constitution, have continually stretched over the past
decades. With the acceleration of globalization in the
1990s, there has been a proliferation of global health
initiatives (e.g., the United Nations Joint Programme
on HIV/AIDS, Global Alliance on Vaccines and
Immunization, the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, the International AIDS
Vaccine Initiative, the Medicines for Malaria Venture,
the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the
UK Department for International Development, the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation, to name just a few).
What this meant is that, by the year 2000, WHO was
competing with all of these new global health institutions
for funding (Lee and Pang, 2014: 120). The upshot of this
highly competitive scenario was that WHO lost the au-
tonomy to define its own institutional priorities: donors
now stipulate how the capital they invest in the WHO
should be spent (Liden, 2014: 142). In other words,
donors’ multiple interests, instead of global health needs,
now determine WHO’s priorities. Donors’ interests are
numerous, ranging from pandemic preparedness and
response to noncommunicable diseases, such as obesity
and mental health, to reproductive rights, to regulation
of tobacco use, to poverty-related illnesses and social
justice, to traffic accidents, to air pollution and environ-
mental issues, and so on. No one would question the
importance of these matters: these are the vast majority
of the global burden of disease. It would seem therefore
fitting that they should all fall under the WHO’s remit.
However, this plethora of interests that now defines
WHO’s priorities are causing confusion when it comes
to choosing between priorities, to such an extent that
WHO itself has recognized that “it has too many prior-
ities, everything being a priority” (WHO, 2013a: 16).
Although WHO has recognized its limitations by self-
proclaiming itself “overcommitted, overextended and in
need of reform” (WHO, 2013b: para 50), the most recent
WHO reforms have ironically been geared toward fur-
ther expanding WHO’s commitments. For example, in
the aftermath of the Ebola outbreak of 2014, the WHO
implemented a number of reforms, including program-
matic as well as institutional changes (Moon et al., 2017).
Global health experts argue that programmatic reforms
have strengthened WHO’s operational capacity—mean-
ing WHO’s ability to actually put “boots on the ground”
so to speak, by creating a health emergencies program
(the Global Outbreak and Response Network), as well as
a contingency fund to provide expedited capital in emer-
gencies, and a global health work force (Moon et al.,
2017). Global health scholars also continue to advocate
for WHO’s institutional reforms, in particular those that
will further strengthen WHO’s monitoring and
compliance mechanisms (Moon et al., 2017). These in-
stitutional reforms would necessitate, of course, an in-
crease in resources: without additional funding there
cannot be a proper implementation of such monitoring
and compliance mechanisms (Moon et al., 2017). For
this reason, the US and Brazil’s recent announcements of
their desire to withdraw from the WHO in the middle of
the COVID-19 pandemic were met with intense criti-
cism. (Burci, 2020; Gostin, 2020; Gostin and Wetter,
2020).
For the post-COVID-19 reforms, global health
experts, by and large, continue to strongly push for the
expansive approach to WHO reform. As supporters of
the WHO, they acknowledge the limitations of WHO’s
capacity in light of the currently available funding, and
push for more funding for the organization. They claim,
accordingly, that WHO should grow in capital, so that
the organization can do more in terms of both oper-
ational capacity as well as monitoring and compliance
(Burci, 2020; Gostin, 2020; Gostin and Wetter, 2020).
For them, only if WHO is given more power and resour-
ces, can it become an effective global health leader
(Gostin, 2020; Gostin and Wetter, 2020). Enhanced ef-
fectiveness in global health leadership would be the result
of both more “boots on the ground” and more “teeth”
through coercive monitoring and compliance mecha-
nisms to be introduced to the IHR (Burci, 2020). A lead-
ership based on both boots and teeth is, they argue,
the most effective way of fulfilling WHO’s “purpose of
co-operation to promote and protect the health of all
peoples” 7. Without power and resources, operational
practices, and a collective system to monitor compli-
ance, the argument goes, WHO would never have the
necessary means to implement even WHO’s most basic
functions to control communicable disease outbreaks—
let alone the overall mission of the organization, namely
“the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible
levels of health”.8 Implicit here is the idea that a good
leader in global health governance should strive to do all
it takes, in using boots and teeth, to fully realize the
ambitious objective of the highest standard of complete
health (i.e., “a state of complete physical, mental and
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease
or infirmity” 9) for all. Alternatively put, a good global
health leader should be ambitious enough to fulfill the
vast mandate entrusted to them and strive to realize all
aspects of the comprehensive definition of the heath for
all people under their leadership. This ambitious aspir-
ation and attitude would be, according to most global
health experts, not only politically justifiable but also the
ethical thing to do: it would be morally wrong not to do
enough.
136 • DE CAMPOS-RUDINSKY
The Ethics Behind WHO’s Ambition
As the global health steward, it would be by and large
blameworthy for WHO not to fulfill the mandate
entrusted to them. However, it would also be ethically
flawed to defend WHO’s ambitious mandate (and the
expansive approach to WHO reform) without acknowl-
edging the conceptual problems inherent to it as well as
its practical consequences. Basically, the ethical error be-
hind the WHO’s mandate and the expansive approach is
moral conflation, leading to confusion in decision-
making.
I have explained elsewhere the problem of moral con-
flation related to the well-being conception of the
human right to health and how it leads to confusion in
practical deliberations, in the following way. I presented
and compared two scenarios. In the first, a patient who
had been infected with the Ebola virus in their last trip to
West Africa. Although the patient has a chance of sur-
vival, they are in urgent need of ZMapp, an experimental
biopharmaceutical drug under development for Ebola
virus disease. The second scenario brings a 16-year-old
patient, suffering from clinical depression, who wishes
for a rhinoplasty, mainly for cosmetic purposes, but also
hoping to improve some mild respiratory problems. The
teenager claims that their appearance has been under-
mining their confidence to the point of ruining their
quality of life and well-being. While treatment with
ZMapp in the first scenario will enhance the patient’s
chances of survival, rhinoplasty in the second scenario
may enhance the patient’s aesthetic sentiment of appre-
ciation and perhaps their overall subjective emotional
evaluation of their self, and therefore their quality of
life and overall well-being.
The WHO’s duty to provide and the patient’s right to
receive cosmetic surgery is prima facie and ceteris paribus
less stringent than the WHO’s duty to provide and the
patient’s right to receive medical treatment for the highly
contagious and deadly Ebola disease. The latter is an
obvious example of a basic health need. The former is
not a basic health need; it is a nonbasic health need that
nevertheless deserves government’s and society’s consid-
eration since it may truly affect the patient’s mental
health, quality of life, and overall well-being. Typically,
basic health needs primarily involve matters of survival,
which are prima facie and ceteris paribus far more mor-
ally stringent and urgent, in a scenario of allocation of
scarce global healthcare resources, than minor risks to
health, or in this case, aesthetic appreciation. However,
when these two different scenarios are put together
under the same label of the well-being conception of
right to health, without an explicit distinction regarding
their different priorities in a situation of scarce resour-
ces, the morally relevant distinction between basic and
nonbasic health needs is obscured: the aspects of health
that are basic for people’s survival, and all the remaining
aspects of health that might affect the patient’s overall
well-being are conflated.
The well-being conception of the human right to
health does not clearly differentiate these different real-
ities of health because both would be justified in attain-
ing the general well-being of patients. As an alternative, I
have proposed the basic health needs conception of the
human right to health, which focuses on the central case
of what constitutes the right to health (de Campos, 2017:
ch 1). Basic health needs would include, for example, the
provision of essential medication for the sick; the provi-
sion of basic healthcare infrastructure (including mater-
nal, newborn, and child health care); sanitation (which is
essential for preventing emerging pathogens, for con-
taining outbreaks, and for responding to them when
they start spreading); the provision of palliative care
for the dying and those facing serious illness (de
Campos, 2016: 75). This is, obviously, not meant to be
a set list of basic health needs applicable to all popula-
tions equally: while, on the one hand, the basic health
needs conception of the human right to health includes
prophylactic treatments and therapeutic care that any
human person objectively speaking need prima facie to
survive, avoid a premature death, and allow for a well-
managed death; on the other hand, the basic health needs
conception of the human right to health also accounts
for the fact that each person will in the reality of their
unique circumstances necessitate these basic health
needs in varying degrees and forms, depending on their
context (de Campos, 2016: 75).
Notwithstanding, the reason why I mention here the
well-being conception in contrast to the basic health
needs conception of the human right to health is this:
there is a need (not only in theory, for the sake of the
moral precision in language, but also in practice, for the
sake of confusion avoidance in decision making) to dif-
ferentiate these two very distinct realities of health. And
this is because different rights and duties bear on these
two different aspects of global health justice, namely the
basic and nonbasic needs of health, when one is dealing
with priority-settings within a context of global scarcity
(de Campos, 2016: 74).10 The stark contrast between the
ZMapp and the rhinoplasty examples help illustrate
these significant moral differences.
One may object here and claim that the well-being
conception of the right to health is not necessarily in-
imical to priority setting. In this sense, my objector here
would tell me that the conflation that I am worried about
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may not necessarily materialize, since the well-being
conception of the right to health could make space for
priority setting to be defined clearly. There is nothing in
the well-being conception—my opponent would then
conclude—that prevents priority setting.
It is perhaps true that the well-being conception of
health would not make priority setting decisions utterly
impossible. However, I would insist that the distinctions
between basic and nonbasic should be made explicit, if
confusion is to be avoided. Without clear distinctions
between what is a basic priority and what is not, deci-
sions on how the WHO should allocate scarce resources
are made more difficult and more confusing than they
should be—especially under very pressing scenarios,
where WHO needs to make complex choices quickly,
while facing pressure from different donors, pushing
for different priorities for the organizations. To be
more specific, these distinctions should be made explicit,
if confusion is to be avoided, because the different rights
and duties that bear on these two different aspects of
global health justice, namely the basic and nonbasic
needs of health, are not so straightforwardly discerned
in practice—particularly within a very pressing context
of global scarcity, coupled with WHO’s overcommit-
ments and overextensions, where WHO is pulled in dif-
ferent directions. All of these make the distinction
between priority and nonpriority a difficult and confus-
ing enterprise for the WHO (WHO, 2013a: 16; WHO,
2013b: para 50).
The theoretical distinction between basic and nonba-
sic health needs is relevant not only for the theoretical
purposes of philosophical contemplation but also for
practical purposes of decision-making. Take, for ex-
ample, the context of a catastrophic pandemic like
COVID-19, where there has been much confusion about
the priority allocation of scarce resources. Here concep-
tual clarity on the distinction between basic and non-
basic health needs would have been helpful in providing
clear ethical justification and practical guidance for pri-
ority settings. The principles and reasons guiding the
definitions of priorities should, however, be clearly
stated before pressing decision-making occurs.
Otherwise, confusion inevitable happens in the reality
of complex real-world problems.
Now, even if one is convinced of the theoretical and
practical necessities of distinguishing between basic and
nonbasic health needs, one could still claim that perhaps
the most complicated priority setting decisions are not
so much between basic and nonbasic health needs, where
the differences between priorities and nonpriorities are
presumably clearer. Instead, the most complex decisions
for the overcommitted and overextended WHO are ac-
tually between two basic health needs.
So let us compare these two scenarios. In the first, that
same Ebola patient, who has a chance of survival, and is
in urgent need of ZMapp. In the second scenario, a 33-
year-old patient, suffering from colon cancer, who has a
chance of survival, and is in urgent need of cancer treat-
ment. Few would disagree that both ZMapp and cancer
treatment are basic health needs, which will enhance the
chances of survival of these two patients. But are WHO’s
duty and capacity to provide ZMapp equal to WHO’s
duty and capacity to provide cancer treatments? Prima
facie and ceteris paribus, yes. But the problem is that
things are not equal when it comes to WHO’s power
and resources to provide both Ebola treatment and can-
cer treatment.
While both treatments are basic health needs, Ebola is
considered an infectious disease that gained the status of
PHEIC, and cancer is noncommunicable disease. PHEIC
is therefore a sub-set of basic health needs that are ser-
ious and can quickly spread across political and geo-
graphical borders, to a point of possibly ensuing in a
pandemic (de Campos, 2020). Undoubtedly, both
Ebola and colon cancer are very serious illnesses that
can cause excruciating suffering in patients. Ethically,
both diseases therefore justify the need to be taken very
seriously and to be addressed as urgently as possible by
those with the capacity to address them most quickly and
effectively. Now, while the WHO, as the chief coordinat-
ing body for global health threats, is in a unique position
to address PHEIC quick and effectively, the organization
has not been in a comparably advantageous position to
address cancers of different sorts as quickly and effect-
ively as other stakeholders (such as local or other global
health actors who are better positioned or equipped to
meet the basic health needs of local populations in need
of cancer treatments of different sorts).
Arguably, the most commendable work that the
WHO has done since its inception is on infectious dis-
eases (Jha, 2017). This is because the WHO is uniquely
placed to facilitate international coordination among
different stakeholders, which is fundamental to contain
the spread of epidemics worldwide. Focusing on PHEICs
(which are, as I am defining here, a sub-set of basic health
needs), while delegating the many other serious basic-
health needs that arise outside of PHEIC (e.g., cancers)
to other local and global health actors in a better position
to address them efficiently and effectively with the inclu-
sion of local communities is, I argue, justifiable for the
purpose of WHO’s priority setting. To focus exclusively
(at least for now) on the sub-set of basic health needs that
qualify as PHEIC and to delegate the other basic health
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needs that are not PHEIC is practically and ethically rea-
sonable. By differentiating these two types of basic health
needs (i.e., those that are PHEIC and those that are ser-
ious noncommunicable diseases) and by arguing that
only PHEIC should fall under WHO’s remit, I am not
saying that PHEIC is more morally relevant than serious
noncommunicable diseases. Nor am I saying that non-
communicable like cancers should not be a priority at all.
Serious noncommunicable diseases are and should be a
priority of local and global health stakeholders better
equipped than the WHO to address these severely debil-
itating illnesses in an efficient and effective manner. The
WHO, however, has never been in a position to do so
well.
But my objector may want to contend here that it is
not easy for WHO (or anyone) to choose between (i)
treating the Ebola patient with some survival chances, or
(ii) providing the cancer treatment to the young adult
with equal or even higher chances of survival, or (iii)
providing the rhinoplasty to the teenage patient who
has an extremely debilitating appearance coupled with
serious mental illness. My opponent here would argue
that WHO should strive to provide all of the three, when-
ever possible. But I would here ask my opponent: is it
possible? Has it ever been possible? Will it ever be pos-
sible? Global healthcare resources have always been
scarce, so the ideal solution of providing Ebola treat-
ment, and cancer treatment, and rhinoplasty is unwork-
able for the WHO. In fact, if Ebola ever becomes a
pandemic, it is not even certain, based on our lived ex-
perience of COVID-19, that WHO would be able to en-
sure that all populations in all Nations could safely
receive adequate Ebola treatment to contain the
pandemic.
Now, I would also have to clarify here in response to
my opponent that an unworkable situation does not
automatically take away the ethical responsibilities of
those involved. In fact, most ethical requirements are
difficult to be put into practice and need consistent in-
tention, good will, careful planning, and hard work. So,
the fact that providing Ebola treatment, cancer treat-
ment, and rhinoplasty is unfeasible does not automatic-
ally mean that providing all of them is not ethically
required. So why then do I defend that providing all
three is not ethically justifiable? Because in a context of
scarce global healthcare resources, WHO has the ethical
responsibility to make difficult choices and prioritize
certain aspects of its mandate (i.e., PHEIC), while dele-
gating some other aspects of its mandates to other global
health stakeholders, namely governments, local com-
munities, and other global health actors, which are better
situated to address them. But this prudent delegation can
only be fully ethically justified if the problem of moral
conflation is fully appreciated.
To further explain the problem of moral conflation
and examine how it leads to practical confusion when it
comes to the specific theme of post-COVID-19 reforms
of the WHO, I will return to the discussion of WHO’s 22
functions, listed in article 2 of the WHO constitution.
Article 2 gives a good illustration of the problem of moral
conflation when it includes in the same list very different
aspects of health and well-being that will have to be
considered within the reality of WHO’s scarce resources
and limited capacities to fulfill them all. Take, for ex-
ample, function (g) to stimulate and advance work to
eradicate epidemic, endemic, and other diseases. Under
function (g), one could think, more specifically, of ways
in which WHO could, in coordination with other stake-
holders, foster the dissemination of scientific data on the
research and development of COVID-19 vaccines. A po-
tential example here could include initiatives inspired
perhaps by the OpenZika platform, which WHO helped
create to encourage researchers to share their scientific
knowledge about the Zika virus in real time in 2016). A
concrete yet different example that stimulates and
advances the work to suppress the COVID-19 pandemic
is the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access—or
COVAX—a global initiative aimed at equitable access
to COVID-19 vaccines led why the WHO, together
with the Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunization, the Coalition for Epidemic
Preparedness Innovators, and other global health actors.
Now take function (i) to promote the improvement of
nutrition, housing, sanitation, recreation, economic or
working conditions, and other aspects of environmental
hygiene. Function (i), as mentioned above, is the source
of what today WHO calls the SDH. For the sake of sim-
plicity, I will elect one single aspect of function (i), name-
ly to promote the improvement of recreation. There is
little doubt that recreation is a human good, necessary
for our health and well-being. Few people would dis-
agree with the necessity of leisure for attaining good
health and human flourishing. However, when the
WHO lists together function (g), which would justify,
for example, the crucial access to medical knowledge on
COVID-19 vaccines, and function (i) based on the
human need of recreation, WHO creates the impression
that both functions are prima facie and ceteris paribus on
a moral par for the purpose of their priority setting. But
they are not equal priorities for the WHO in a context of
scarce resources and limited capacities—which is
WHO’s reality. Because they are not equal priorities
for the WHO, they should not receive the same amount
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of funding or the same level of institutional support,
coming from the WHO.
To list functions (g) and (i) together, with no clear
distinction regarding how WHO should set priorities
when capacity to discharge both functions is insufficient,
inevitably creates practical difficulties and confusions
that could be avoided by conceptual clarifications.
Access to medical knowledge on COVID-19 vaccines
[function (g)] pertains to the realm of basic health needs
that qualify as PHEIC. Recreation [function (i)] belongs
to the category of nonbasic health needs/SDH. These
distinctions are relevant and should be made explicit,
if confusion is to be avoided. Again, this is because the
different rights and duties that bear on these two differ-
ent aspects of global health justice, namely the basic and
nonbasic needs of health, are not so straightforwardly
discerned in practice—particularly within a very press-
ing context of global scarcity, coupled with WHO’s over-
commitments and overextensions, where WHO is
pulled in different directions. And all of these make the
distinction between priority and nonpriority a difficult
and confusing enterprise for the WHO to make on the
spot, during a global crisis (WHO, 2013a: 16; WHO,
2013b: para 50).
One could rightly object here and say that recreation is
vital, including in an exceptional context of emergency
like the COVID-19 pandemic. The objector here could
bring me the example of healthcare professionals, caring
for COVID-19 patients: they need adequate leisure to
recharge their energies and be able to continue to care
for their patients. Then, the objector could also rightly
remind me that recreation has perhaps become even
more relevant during the COVID-19 lockdowns, be-
cause of the pandemic’s high impact on mental and
physical health. And I would agree with my objector
here: (a) it is irrefutable that healthcare professionals
have a right to rest and also a duty to care for themselves
adequately; and (b) it is also unquestionable that recre-
ation is indispensable for an adequate level of mental and
physical health. However, these do not entail that, in an
exceptional context of emergency like the COVID-19
pandemic, the WHO should be as committed to recre-
ation as it is in a context of normalcy, where scarcity and
limitations are not as pressing. In fact, it is hard to im-
agine how recreation would not be somehow de-priori-
tized by the WHO (at least in the short-term) during a
pandemic. This is not to say that individuals, local com-
munities, governments should not try to use their cre-
ativity and foster forms of recreations during times of
crisis (after all, recreation is necessary to build resilience
and hope in times of difficulties). But this is just to say
that WHO, pressed by time and resource constraints,
may need to put considerations regarding recreation (to-
gether with other nonbasic health needs/SDH and basic
needs that do not qualify as PHEIC) aside in order to be
able to discern clearly how to set priorities and ration
scarce healthcare resources in responding to the pan-
demic. Again, this does not mean that recreation (or
any other nonbasic health needs/SDH and non-PHEIC
basic health needs) is not important. Quite the contrary:
recreation is crucial for physical and mental health. But
my point is that the WHO’s mission to promote recre-
ation should be delegated to national governments and
local communities, instead of being imposed from the
top-down (i.e., from the WHO to national governments
and local communities, who are better placed to design
safe COVID-19 policies on recreational activities,
attuned to their local costumes).
Recreation and other nonbasic health needs/SDH will,
more directly or more indirectly, influence people’s
health. Although these nonbasic health needs/SDH are
all relevant (some way or another) to individual and
population health, they cannot be all reduced to health,
because they often need to be addressed in particular
ways. To put this another way, the right to health is
not the only human right (Tasioulas, 2020). Sure,
human rights are all interdependent and indivisible,
meaning that they cannot be enjoyed fully without an-
other. However, human rights cannot be all reduced to
an all-encompassing reading of the right to health
(Tasioulas, 2020). Recreation is a distinct right, which
should be the priority of local public policies, local gov-
ernments, and local communities, rather than the prior-
ity of the WHO. Locals should be primarily in charge of
recreation (and other nonbasic health needs/SDH), un-
less the local government and local communities have
requested WHO’s (and other countries and other global
health stakeholders’) assistance in respecting, protect-
ing, and fulfilling the right to recreation. Again, I am
not suggesting here that recreation is unconnected to
health. Recreation bears on health. Good health depends
on recreation. But health and recreation are irreducible
human goods: both are necessary for the good life of an
individual and the common good of all. And a human
good cannot be reduced as mere means to another
human good (Finnis, 1983). To reduce recreation to
health and to conflate these two human goods is a mis-
take: each ground different rights, and each of these
rights will ground different duties for their full
realization.
To set aside recreation in order to free WHO to focus
the use of its scarce resources on tackling core global
emergency questions pertaining a pandemic is, in other
words, to morally distinguish different aspects of the
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human right to health (i.e., PHEIC basic health needs,
non-PHEIC basic health needs, and nonbasic health
needs/SDH). This exercise of moral reasoning is, obvi-
ously, not always straightforward. The clear separation
between basic and nonbasic health needs/SDH (de
Campos, 2016), and between basic health needs that
qualify as global health emergencies and those basic
health needs that are not PHEIC (de Campos, 2020), is
not always evident, requiring some moral contemplation
that allows for careful analysis. But thorough moral rea-
soning requires time. So the moment when an outbreak
emerges and difficult ethical decisions need to be made
quickly and in coordination with other countries to con-
tain the spread of infectious diseases is not the best time
for engaging with nuanced moral reasoning of this sort.
The most appropriate time for moral contemplation of
this kind, leading to clear moral distinctions that provide
good guidance and reasons for action, is before another
outbreak occurs and not during a global crisis. The WHO
reform, which will likely take place in the aftermath of
the COVID-19 pandemic, offers a good opportunity to
review the WHO constitution, in general, and WHO’s
overambitious mandate reflecting WHO’s inflated def-
inition of health as well-being, in particular. In this re-
view process, WHO would do well in identifying the core
global emergency questions which the organization
should prioritize for now, delegating most of the non-
PHEIC basic health needs and the nonbasic health
needs/SDH to other global health stakeholders, better
suited to realize them.
My objector here would want to remind me and insist
that the well-being conception of the right to health and
WHO’s broad mandate are not necessarily inimical to
priority setting: the well-being conception of the right to
health and WHO’s broad mandate can, my opponent
would argue, appreciate for example that the pursuit of
recreation and the pursuit of a vaccine for COVID-19
are, naturally, priorities of different status. Although re-
creation and a COVID-19 vaccine should not receive the
same amount of funding or institutional support, there
are—my opponent would maintain—good reasons to
have a broad range of foci under the WHO remit. For
example, a broad mandate with several functions, would
allow sharing of expertise between areas, and my overly
literal interpretation of a list of priorities would impede
such organizational sharing.
True, sharing and coordination are one of WHO’s
core purposes: as the coordinating authority for global
health, WHO is indeed expected to share communica-
tion in a coordinated manner within the WHO itself and
with other global stakeholders. But my point is exactly
that proper sharing and coordination have not
happened. WHO has not been successful in performing
its core purposes. And one of the reasons why WHO has
not adequately shared communication in a coordinated
manner is moral conflation and the overcommitments
that ensue.11
The moral conflations embedded in the WHO consti-
tution are not merely a theoretical abstract predicament
to entertain philosophical minds. These moral confla-
tions have serious practical consequences. The lack of a
more nuanced understanding of WHO’s mandate and a
more sophisticated conception of the human right to
health—nuanced and sophisticated enough to capture
the moral distinction between basic and nonbasic health
needs/SDH (de Campos, 2016), and between global
health emergencies and basic health needs that arise out-
side of PHEIC (de Campos, 2020)—inevitably leads to
moral confusions.
Moral confusion is the source of practical indecision,
then leading to either inaction or imprudent action. And
these have been precisely the upshots of WHO’s moral
confusion: inaction and imprudent action, especially in
the context of PHEICs, such as the Ebola and COVID-19
outbreaks, when WHO’s delays and unwise choices have
been heavily criticized. In trying to do everything that its
mandate allows it to do, WHO has been unable to pri-
oritize what needs to be done first. Morally confused,
WHO has lost its bearings, either in its inaction or in
its imprudent actions. In its own words, WHO has
“spread too thinly” (WHO, 2013a). How to reform the
WHO, though? I here suggest a dose of humility to coun-
teract overambition.
The Humble Approach to WHO
Reform
The expansive approach toz the WHO reform conflates
good leadership in global health governance with the
ambition to attain for all peoples the (impossible) stand-
ard of complete health (i.e., “state of complete physical,
mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence
of disease or infirmity”12), as defined in the WHO con-
stitution and subsequent UN documents establishing
the human right to health. This study has discussed the
underlying moral problems of the expansive approach as
well as its practical implications. In this section the study
puts forth its central argument that to be a better leader,
WHO should be less ambitious, do much less, and have a
much narrower mandate. The humble approach to the
WHO reform not only makes sense in terms of (i) pol-
itical feasibility, but also in terms of (ii) ethical reasons.
First, it is politically unfeasible to expect a dramatic
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expansion of WHO’s budget, as it would be in fact
required if WHO were to fulfill all or most of the
twenty-two functions listed in WHO’s constitution.
Second, it is ethically unreasonable to keep WHO re-
sponsible for performing those functions that would
be better performed by other stakeholders, especially
governments and local actors, which are more cognizant
of the particularities of their epidemiological conditions,
institutional culture, and social traditions.13 Given the
political unfeasibility and the ethical unreasonableness
of the expansive approach to the WHO reform, a better
approach would be to do less and delegate more of
WHO’s functions to other global health stakeholders
(especially governments and local actors). In this way,
the functions that WHO itself performs would be
restricted to those that can be best performed by WHO
itself, rather than other global health stakeholders (Clift,
2014: 12).
What are the roles that the WHO is uniquely placed to
execute? As discussed in the previous section, WHO’s
mandate and functions are very broad. WHO itself has
acknowledged that it “lacks a clear grasp of its compara-
tive advantage, including at country level, at times taking
on what others might do better” (WHO, 2013a). Global
health experts have tried to identify WHO’s core func-
tions amidst those 22 listed in article 2 of the WHO
constitution. Some experts have reduced the lengthy
list to nine core functions, although they could not all
agree on the nine items (Clift, 2014: 9). Others have
defined the four essential functions of the global health
system, and one would expect that these four items
would be more agreeable or less contentious (Frenk
and Moon, 2013: 940). Yet others have managed to fur-
ther simplify the list and more accurately identify the two
core functions of the WHO: (i) its technical role of
knowledge generation and dissemination, in which
WHO has the responsibility to gather and share epidem-
ic intelligence; and (ii) normative role of knowledge
translation, in which the WHO has the responsibility
to translate scientific evidence into advice and recom-
mendations on how to control a PHEIC (Lee and Walt,
1992; Lee and Pang, 2014: 120).14
In the post COVID-19 scenario, it is expected that
there will be little disagreement on the need for better
coordinated communication of available knowledge to
prevent and respond to global health threats like pan-
demics. In this way, most people would agree that the
functions of (i) knowledge generation and dissemin-
ation and (ii) knowledge translation are indeed
WHO’s two core functions, given their indispensable
role in controlling PHEICs. These two functions, there-
fore, establish the common ground on which most
people can agree when it comes to WHO functions.
However, in order to generate, disseminate, and trans-
late knowledge on PHEIC and do it not only properly,
but well, WHO would need to free itself of other non-
basic and nonemergency-related functions. This would
enable WHO to focus the use of its scarce resources on
ensuring that coordinated communications regarding
PHEIC are truthful, evidence-based, consistent, and
timely shared among all WHO member-states and other
global health stakeholders.
There is, nevertheless, a complication with the humble
approach to the WHO reform and the required delega-
tion of WHO functions to other global health stakehold-
ers. The complication is this: since WHO’s budget
depends in large proportion on donations, and donors
normally tend to tie their donation to the performance
of specific functions, tasks, and programs (Lee and Walt,
1992; Lee and Pang, 2014: 120),15 the decision to delegate
particular functions to other stakeholders may not ne-
cessarily result in additional resources that would then
be free to be allocated for the retained functions (Clift,
2014: 11). This is indeed a difficulty. However, the fact
that something is challenging does not entail that it is not
the right thing to do, or that it should not be pursued.
Truthful communication and further negotiations with
donors could quite plausibly lead to a satisfactory out-
come enabling the humble approach to WHO reform.
This would be a credible scenario if donors were con-
vinced of the benefits of the humble approach.
Donors would have to be persuaded of the advantages
of drastically reducing WHO’s mandate and solely
focusing on gathering scientific evidence on how to con-
trol PHEIC and communicating it in a truthful, timely,
and coordinated manner. This humble mandate for the
WHO proves beneficial and reasonable in at least two
(interconnected) ways. First, by focusing exclusively on
ensuring truthful, timely, and coordinated communica-
tions among stakeholders, WHO would be able to con-
centrate its finite capacities in performing well its key
purpose as a coordinating body for global health threats
like pandemics. The benefit here would be a much-
needed enhanced effectiveness in global health coordin-
ation and communication in the context of PHEIC.
Second, in performing said coordinated communica-
tions well, WHO could potentially regain public trust as
a legitimate coordinating authority for global health se-
curity matters.16 During the COVID-19 pandemic, con-
cealment of information, misinformation, and
incoherent communication have further eroded trust
in WHO (Friedman, 2020).17 For example, inconsistent
advice and changing messages about the personal use of
masks without previous clarification on why the issue
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was divisive, gave the public the impression that deci-
sions by the WHO and governments on this matter were
unreliable and arbitrary (Yong, 2020). The changing na-
ture of COVID-19 policies on masks was based on emerg-
ing scientific evidence of asymptomatic viral transmission,
which recommended that everyone wear a face mask in
public spaces. In other words, the shifting scientific evi-
dence grounded the changing guidance in COVID-19 pol-
icies. The problem, however, was that this communication
process between the scientific community and policy-
makers was not always accurately shared with (i.e., contex-
tualized and explained to) all other stakeholders, including
the public, and this led to the erosion of public trust in
health authorities like the WHO (de Campos-Rudinsky
and Undurraga, 2021; Veit et al., 2021). A similar pattern
of inconsistent recommendation and shifting messages was
also observed in relation to travel bans: while not instruct-
ing countries against quarantines, WHO advised countries
against travel bans pursuant to IHR.18 But governments
subsequently established travel bans together with quaran-
tines, disregarding the binding legal document (i.e., the
IHR) to which they had agreed. Perhaps governments
would have been more compliant with WHO’s directions
on travel restrictions if WHO had done a better job not only
in fully contextualizing why the issue was divisive, but also
in explaining the evidence-based reasons why WHO
advised against travel bans while not discouraging quaran-
tine at the same time. WHO failed to accurately commu-
nicate why their advice on travel restrictions and
quarantines were not necessarily contradictory, and how
they are actually consistent within the IHR framework
(Habibi et al., 2020).
Accurate communication means communication that
is truthful, evidence-based, consistent, and timely
shared. This requires being transparent about what
WHO, governments, and scientists know and do not
yet know about the virus and the disease. When deci-
sion-makers are truthful about what they know and do
not know, and are truthful about uncertainties, the pub-
lic can better understand when shifting evidence leads to
a new policy direction without forming the impression
that those changes are whimsical or defective (Yong,
2020).19 However, this level of honesty about what one
does not know necessitates humility in acknowledging
one’s limitations. Although humility in accepting one’s
vulnerabilities in this way is uncomfortable, it is highly
effective in building trustworthiness. This is precisely the
second benefit of the humble approach: it has the poten-
tial to redeem the public trust in WHO’s words and
deeds.20
Conclusions
This study argued against the expansive approach to the
WHO reform, according to which to be a better global
health leader, WHO should do more, be given more
power and financial resources, have more operational
capacities, and have more teeth by introducing more
coercive monitoring and compliance mechanisms to
its IHR (Gostin, 2014, 2020; Gostin and Friedman,
2014; Gostin et al., 2015; Kickbusch and Reddy, 2015;
Mackey, 2016; Negri, 2018; Burci, 2020; Gostin and
Wetter, 2020). The main flaw of the expansive approach
is to conflate good leadership in global health govern-
ance with the ambition to attain for all peoples the (im-
possible) standard of complete health (i.e., “state of
complete physical, mental, and social well-being and
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”21), as
defined in the WHO constitution and UN documents
establishing the human right to health, which is neither
politically feasible nor morally justifiable.
As an alternative, the study put forth the humble ap-
proach to the WHO reform, and argued that to be a
better leader, WHO should do much less and have a
much narrower mandate. More specifically, WHO
should focus exclusively on coordination efforts, by
ensuring truthful, evidence-based, consistent, and time-
ly shared communications regarding PHEIC among
WHO member-states and other global health stakehold-
ers, if the organization desires to be a real global health
leader whose authority the international community
respects and whose guidance people trust.
Notes
1. For a historical analysis of the perennial nature of
WHO reform debates since the 1990s, see (Lee and
Pang 2014).
2. WHO, International Health Regulations (IHR),
2005, WHA 58.3, 2nd edn. Geneva: World Health
Organization
3. WHO Constitution, 1948, Preamble
4. WHO Constitution, 1948, Preamble. See also: UN
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966, art 12; and UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) General comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
(Art 12 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights), 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, 12
August.
5. See: http://www.who.int/social_determinants/en/.
POST-COVID-19 WHO REFORM • 143
6. On justice-related questions on social determinants
of health, including the relationship among income,
inequality, and heath, see the 2009 special sympo-
sium edition on “Justice and the Social
Determinants of Health” of this journal, in particu-
lar: (Venkatapuram, 2009; Verweij, 2009; Wilson,
2009; Wolff, 2009).
On the legal aspects of social determinants of health,
see: (Coggon 2020)
7. WHO Constitution, 1948, Preamble
8. WHO Constitution, 1948, Art 1.
9. WHO Constitution, 1948, Preamble. See also: UN
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966, art 12; and UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) General comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
(Art 12 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights), 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, 12
August.
10. For a detailed discussion of the problem of moral
conflation in the well-being conception of health,
see: de Campos, Cambridge University Press, 2017,
ch 1, p.20.
11. Coordination and communication are not syn-
onymous. Coordination is WHO’s core purpose
and communication is a condition for coordination
to ensue. But if truthful and timely communications
are necessary conditions for good coordination,
then by focusing on ensuring truthful and timely
communications among stakeholders, WHO would
be focusing on performing its core purpose (i.e.,
coordination) well.
12. WHO Constitution, 1948, Preamble. See also: UN
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966, art 12; and UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) General comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
(Art 12 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights), 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, 12
August.
13. This would be contrary to the structural principle of
subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity has
proved to be an effective governance tool over cen-
turies. It basically establishes that where families,
neighborhoods, and local communities, and local
governments can effectively address their own prob-
lems, they should do so; and only where they cannot,
then other countries and other higher-level struc-
tures of power and authority should intervene and
provide aid (i.e., subsidium). The term “sub-sid-
iary”—which literally means to “seat” (“sid”) an
activity down (“sub”) as close to the problem as
possible—recognizes the value of first trying to solve
social problems locally and moving up to higher
levels of governance only as necessary. See: de
Campos, 2017, chapter 3.
14. More specifically, these two functions would in-
clude, for example, collecting and disseminating
international health data, agreeing nomenclature,
producing guidelines and protocols, promoting re-
search, hosting technical meetings of experts.
15. Examples of donor-friendly activities whose impact
is more visible, include: providing emergency relief,
distributing drugs,, immunizing children, and fight-
ing outbreaks on the ground. These are more
impactful because they tend to more easily to gen-
erate public approval. (Lee, Pang 2014, at 120)
16. On the relationship between truthful communica-
tions and trust (or lack thereof) in the WHO, see:
Prah Ruger 2020. For a philosophical account on the
relationship between truthfulness and trust, see:
O’Neill, 2002. For O’Neill, to deserve trust, health-
care institutions and practitioners must fulfil the
requirements of trustworthiness, which include
honesty, particularly in their communications. On
the relationship between truthfulness and trust in
public health institutions, such as the WHO, in the
particular context of the COVID-19 pandemic, see:
Veit, Brown, Earp, 2020; van der Bles, van der
Linden, Freeman, Spiegelhalter, 2020.
17. Recent events during the COVID-19 pandemic have
led some to believe that there is a widespread lack of
trust not only in international cooperation and
multilateralism in general, but in the WHO in par-
ticular (Taylor; Habibi. 2020; Gvosdev 2020). The
erosion of public trust in the WHO is an ongoing
problem. (Jha 2017; Bain, Ebuenyi 2017). More re-
cently, the lack of trust in the WHO was manifested
itself more concretely, for example, in the US with-
draw from the WHO under the Trump administra-
tion, Brazil’s withdraw from the organization under
Bolsonaro’s administration, as well as in several
other countries’ complete disregard of WHO’s
recommendations for the COVID-19 pandemic
suppression (including WHO’s legal recommenda-
tions and obligations contained in International
Health Regulations, the multilateral instrument
that governs how 196 states and WHO should col-
lectively contain the global spread of diseases).
(Gilsinan, 2020; Habibi et al., 2020; Victor and
Hauser 2020).
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18. Article 43 of the IHR restricts the measures that
WHO member-states can implement when address-
ing public health threats when those measures are not
supported by science, commensurate with the risks
involved, or anchored in human rights. (WHO. 2005.
International Health Regulations, WHA 58.3, 2nd
edn. Geneva: World Health Organization, Art 43).
The purpose of article 43 is to prevent member-states
from taking unnecessary measures that may harm
people or that dis-incentivize other countries from
reporting new public health threats to international
public health authorities. (Habibi et al., 2020)
19. I have used the word “truthful” throughout this
paper to mean honest, open, candid, transparent
communications, especially about one’s limitations
(e.g., institutional limitations, capacity limitations,
knowledge limitations). My use of the word ‘truth-
ful’ should not imply, however, that the WHO (or
other public health authorities) certainly communi-
cated lies in the past, casting aspersions on the legit-
imacy of the WHO as an agency.
20. Flawed communication alone may not justify a com-
plete institutional reform of the WHO. This would
be stretching the argument presented in this paper.
Nevertheless, lack of truthful, timely, and coordi-
nated communications combined with the erosion
of public trust in the organization are strong indi-
cations that some sort of institutional reform is ne-
cessary and would be welcomed. All that the paper is
arguing is that, if WHO would commit to do less,
openly sharing what the organization can and can-
not do (including what the organization has done
well since 1946), the organization could then also
address the problem of erosion of public trust. This
is the sort of reform (which I have called the humble
approach) that this paper has argued for and the
potential benefits that it could bring.
21. WHO Constitution, 1948, Preamble. See also: UN
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966, art 12; and UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) General comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
(Art 12 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights), 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, 12
August
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